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1. People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165 (1942).
2. Id.




By Rachel A. Van Cleave*
Introduction
People v. Gonzales1 involved an issue that continues to divide lawyers, judges,
scholars, politicians, as well as the general public: how best to protect indi-
viduals from law enforcement conduct that violates constitutional protections?
This question is particularly controversial in the context of a criminal case,
since the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence often results in the alleged
criminal going free. In Gonzales, the California Supreme Court was asked to
adopt the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of constitutional rights.2
A majority of California Supreme Court justices answered this in the negative.
Justice Carter disagreed, and his analysis provided an initial spark to the mod-
ern state constitutional law movement in California, as well as a strong caution
against allowing government officials to ignore the law with impunity.
Secundo Valenzano notified police that he had met with two men, Gonza-
les and Chierotti, who showed him a machine that reproduced currency using
real currency. Gonzales and Chierotti encouraged Valenzano to bring several
thousand dollars to them to double his money with the machine. Subsequently,
two police officers entered Chierotti’s apartment when he was not home and
took a black case that contained the currency-producing machine and bottles
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3. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 (1922).
5. Cal. Const. art. I, §19.
6. See Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d at 165.
7. Id. at 175 (Carter, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 177.
of chemicals. The officers did not have a warrant, nor did they have any other
authority to enter Chierotti’s home. Both Gonzales and Chierotti objected to
the admission at trial of this evidence as well as to the testimony of the offi-
cers about what they found in Chierotti’s apartment. The trial court admitted
the evidence and the testimony and the jury convicted Gonzales and Chierotti.
On appeal, the two defendants argued that the police officers had violated
both the United States Constitution as well as the California Constitution, by
entering and searching Chierotti’s home and seizing the black case and its con-
tents. There was no question that the conduct of the police officers was illegal.
Furthermore, there was no doubt that if the police had been federal officers,
the decision of the United States Supreme Court inWeeks v. United States would
have required exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence.3 However, as of the
time of Gonzales, the United States Supreme Court had determined that not
all of the protections in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution were
binding on the states. Indeed, twenty years earlier, California had rejected the
exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence.4 Although the majority in
Gonzales acknowledged that the provision in the California Constitution pro-
tecting “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures”5 is nearly identical to
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the court nonethe-
less held that the California Constitution did not require the Court to adopt
the exclusionary rule. The majority, instead, focused its analysis on an inter-
pretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution, and concluded that the exclusionary rule was not required
to preserve fundamental fairness.6
In his dissent, Justice Carter explicitly eschewed any analysis of the Federal
Constitution and instead focused exclusively on whether the state Constitution
“compels the rule that evidence obtained in contravention thereof shall not be
competent or admissible.”7 Justice Carter’s primary concern was that the major-
ity’s failure to adopt the exclusionary rule would diminish the significance of rights
that were designed to protect the “life, liberty and property of the people.”8 His
opinion also recognized that these constitutional protections are not simply for
those who engage in criminal activity, but also for law-abiding people who might
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9. Id.
suffer when law enforcement authorities abuse their authority. The second-to-
last paragraph of Justice Carter’s dissent makes poignant reference to the“tyranny
of totalitarianism” in other parts of the world and the need to resist any abroga-
tion of constitutional rights to preserve our constitutional form of government.9
DISSENT
Carter, J. I dissent.
The rule followed by the majority opinion seriously impairs the efficacy and
sanctity of the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures.
(citation omitted). The particular issue is the [admissibility] of evidence in a
criminal proceeding which has been obtained from defendant in violation of
that constitutional prohibition. Although it is my opinion that the same con-
stitutional guarantee appearing in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is applicable to states as well as federal agencies because it
is one of the fundamental liberties embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, I will limit my discussion to the propo-
sition that even if the right to be secure against unlawful searches and seizures
is not protected by the federal Constitution with reference to state agencies,
the provision in our state Constitution compels the rule that evidence obtained
in contravention thereof shall not be competent or admissible (emphasis added).
It cannot be seriously questioned that to permit the use of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the constitutional provision at least to some extent in-
fringes upon the field of liberty secured by the inhibition against unlawful
searches and seizures. But it goes beyond a mere partial invasion. It in effect
practically destroys the right. That is true for the reason that the value of any
right varies in direct proportion to the means afforded for the protection of
the right; the realization of any benefit from the right is wholly dependent
upon the existence of instruments for that purpose. If it may be violated and
the fruits of the violation directed against the possessor of it, the fruits of it are
lost, and it is no more than a bare abstraction.
I take it that a person in preserving the right here involved is justified in
committing homicide. However, if he does not adopt that extreme measure,
and in a well ordered social system that should be discouraged, he is faced with
[the] possibility that evidence obtained may be used against him. Certainly he
should be given credit and security rather than being penalized for failing to
pursue such an extreme course.
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Permitting such evidence to be used is an invitation and encouragement to
law enforcing officials to violate the Constitution. It gives them free rein to act
upon mere suspicion and conjecture, to the harassment of the persons of-
fended and to the end that the sanctity of his home or depository of his papers
and effects is destroyed. It is of small comfort to say that he has an action
against the officers. In most instances the amount of recovery would be neg-
ligible and the process costly. . . .
Obviously, the purpose and object of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was to guarantee security to the individual against invasion of his prem-
ises by officers seeking evidence which might be used by them in a criminal
prosecution without making oath or affirmation particularly describing the
place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized. In other words, it was
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution that before an officer should
be permitted to secure evidence by means of a search and seizure, the facts
supporting the claim of right to make the search should be submitted to a mag-
istrate in the form of an affidavit, and if the magistrate determined such facts
to be sufficient he would issue a warrant authorizing the search of premises
particularly described in the warrant and the seizure of the person or thing
particularly described therein. To say that to permit the use of evidence ac-
quired in violation of this constitutional provision does not abrogate or de-
stroy the constitutional right so guaranteed is to my mind counterfeit logic.
History reveals many abuses by public officers both in England and colonial
times in this country when officers invaded the premises of persons suspected
of crimes, many of which have long since been abolished, and the papers and
effects of innocent victims seized and used for the persecution as well as pros-
ecution of such victims. It was to prevent these abuses that the Fourth Amend-
ment was added to the Constitution of the United States and section 19 of
article I was incorporated in the Constitution of California. In my opinion
there is no such urgency or necessity enjoined upon prosecuting officers today
to obtain evidence of law violation which requires them to violate a constitu-
tional provision so specific in its prohibitions, and which has enshrined within
its provisions such sacred concepts of liberty, security and justice as the con-
stitutional provision here in question.
The more I read and hear about the tyranny of totalitarianism as it per-
vades a large part of the world today, the more appreciative I am of the con-
stitutional form of government and the constitutional guarantees which we
have in this country and in this state. And every time I see an effort being made
to abrogate or nullify by interpretation any of the constitutional provisions de-
signed to protect the life, liberty and property of the people, I shudder to con-
template what will happen if this disposition to abrogate and nullify these
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10. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434 (1955) (Justice Carter was still on the California
Supreme Court and joined the majority opinion).
11. Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
constitutional provisions continues. I, for one, shall never yield to the doc-
trine that a constitutional provision designed to protect the life, liberty and
property of the people of this country should be abrogated or nullified by in-
terpretation. If political, social or economic conditions require changes in our
Constitution, such changes should be made by amending the Constitution in
the manner prescribed by it, but it is not for the courts by their decisions to
abrogate or nullify constitutional provisions by interpretation or read into
those provisions that which was never intended to be included therein.
In my opinion it was prejudicial error requiring a reversal of the judgment
for the trial court to admit the evidence obtained by the police officers as the
result of the unlawful entry and search of the premises occupied by the de-
fendants, and the judgment of conviction against them should therefore be
reversed.
Comment
The two salient points of Justice Carter’s dissenting opinion in Gonzales in-
volve his reliance on the state constitution as a source of law and his fear of
unchecked law enforcement powers. Both concerns prevailed in a subsequent
decision by the California Supreme Court.
Thirteen years after Gonzales, the California Supreme Court adopted Justice
Carter’s position in People v. Cahan,10 in an opinion written by Justice Traynor,
who had written the majority opinion in Gonzales. In a four-to-three decision,
the court evaluated the policy arguments involved and concluded that the Cal-
ifornia Constitution required the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained, and
overruled People v. Gonzales. During the intervening thirteen years, the United
States Supreme Court had held that the protections of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states.11 However,
until the 1961 decision of Mapp v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court did
not require states to exclude evidence obtained in violation of these protec-
tions.12
Justice Carter’s dissent in Gonzales relied specifically on the California Con-
stitution in concluding that the exclusionary rule was necessary to protect con-
stitutional rights. Thus, his dissent was the precursor to the court’s decision in
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13. Robin B. Johansen, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the
State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 301 (1977).
14. People v. Martin, 290 P. 2d 855 (1955).
15. Goldstein v. U.S., 316 U.S. 114 (1941).
16. Cardenas v. Super. Ct., 363 P. 2d 889 (1961).
17. Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
18. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
19. In re Klor, 415 P. 2d 791 (1966).
20. People v. Belous, 458 P. 2d 194 (1969).
21. Loving v. V.A., 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating miscegenation statutes); Stanley v.
G.A., 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (recognizing right to possess obscene materials in one’s home);
Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a statute criminalizing voluntary abortions).
Cahan, and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp. The Cahan
decision was the first of many decisions by the California Supreme Court fo-
cusing on the meaning of the state constitution as a document independent
from the Federal Constitution. Indeed, only twenty-two years after Cahan,
California was described as having led “the nation in the development of in-
dependent interpretation” of state constitutions.13
Many decisions of the California Supreme Court interpreted the state con-
stitution in ways that presaged decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and often afforded broader constitutional protections to people living in Cal-
ifornia. For example, in the same year the court decided Cahan, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held in People v. Martin that the state constitution permitted
a defendant to object to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of an-
other person’s rights.14 The United States Supreme Court had previously rejected
the so-called vicarious exclusionary rule in Goldstein v. United States.15 In Car-
denas v. Superior Court,16 the California Supreme Court interpreted the state
constitutional protection against double jeopardy, predating the United States
Supreme Court decision finding that this protection in the Federal Constitu-
tion applied to the states.17
Beyond criminal procedure rights, the California Supreme Court held un-
constitutional statutes that prohibited “mixed-race” marriages,18 and recog-
nized the right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one’s home,19 as
well as a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.20 These decisions, a few of
many, each preceded similar decisions by the United States Supreme Court.21
Justice Carter’s dissent in Gonzales, as later adopted in Cahan, helped to fuel
state court interest in state constitutions.
Justice Carter also expressed concern that abrogating constitutional provi-
sions intended to protect life, liberty, and property would put the country on
a path that he “shudder[ed] to contemplate,” and put our constitutional form
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22. James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on CallersWithout Courts, 12/16/05
NYT A1 2005 WLNR 20281359.
23. See Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 446.
24. Id. at 447.
of government at risk. The anxiety that Justice Carter articulated serves as an
appropriate reminder even today. At the time of the writing of this comment,
the United States is embroiled in a dispute over the widespread practice of il-
legal wiretapping engaged in by the Federal Government.22 In People v. Cahan,
Justice Traynor echoed Justice Carter’s concern about the consequences of not
protecting constitutional rights. Pointing to the importance of the rule of law,
the majority stated “[i]t is morally incongruous for the state to flout constitu-
tional rights and at the same time demand that its citizens observe the law.”23
The Cahan majority also stated “[t]oday one of the foremost public concerns
is the police state, and recent history has demonstrated all too clearly how
short the step is from lawless although efficient enforcement of the law to the
stamping out of human rights.”24
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